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How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum
cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem—measurement device independent
quantum key distribution. It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the
secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical
components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous
solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of
near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a
quantum non-demolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key
generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD.
The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200km will remain secure even
with seriously flawed detectors.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
(typically called Alice and Bob) to generate a common
string of secret bits, called a secret key, in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve [1]. This key can be used for
tasks such as secure communication and authentication.
Unfortunately, there is a big gap between the theory and
practice of QKD. In principle, QKD offers unconditional
security guaranteed by the laws of physics [2–4]. How-
ever, real-life implementations of QKD rarely conform
to the assumptions in idealized models used in security
proofs. Indeed, by exploiting security loopholes in practi-
cal realizations, especially imperfections in the detectors,
different attacks have been successfully launched against
commercial QKD systems [5, 6], thus highlighting their
practical vulnerabilities.
To connect theory with practice again, several ap-
proaches have been proposed. The first one is the pre-
sumably hard-verifiable problem of trying to characterize
real devices fully and account for all side channels. The
second approach is a teleportation trick [2, 7]. The third
solution is (full) device independent QKD (DI-QKD) [9].
This last technique does not require detailed knowledge
of how QKD devices work and can prove security based
on the violation of a Bell inequality. Unfortunately, DI-
QKD is highly impractical because it needs near unity
detection efficiency together with a qubit amplifier or
a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement of the
number of photons in a pulse, and even then generates
an extremely low key rate (of order 10−10 bits per pulse)
at practical distances [10].
In this Letter we present the idea of measurement de-
vice independent QKD (MDI-QKD) as a simple solution
to remove all (existing and yet to be discovered) detector
side channels [6], arguably the most critical part of the
implementation, and show that it has both excellent se-
curity and performance. Therefore, it offers an immense
security advantage over standard security proofs such as
Inamori-Lu¨tkenhaus-Mayers (ILM) [11] and Gottesman-
Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [12]. Furthermore, it
has the power to double the transmission distance that
can be covered by those QKD schemes that use conven-
tional laser diodes, and its key generation rate is compa-
rable to that of standard security proofs with entangled
pairs. In contrast to DI-QKD, in its simplest formulation
MDI-QKD requires the additional assumption that Alice
and Bob have almost perfect state preparation. How-
ever, we believe that this is only a minor drawback be-
cause Alice’s and Bob’s signal sources can be attenuated
laser pulses prepared by themselves. Their states can
thus be experimentally verified in a fully protected lab-
oratory environment outside Eve’s interference through
random sampling. Moreover, as will be discussed later,
imperfections in Alice’s and Bob’s preparation process
can, in fact, be readily taken care of in a more refined
formulation of the protocol.
A simple example of our method is as follows. Both
Alice and Bob prepare phase randomized weak coherent
pulses (WCPs) in the four possible BB84 polarization
states [13] and send them to an untrusted relay Charlie
(or Eve) located in the middle, who performs a Bell state
measurement that projects the incoming signals into a
Bell state [14]. Such measurement can be realized, for
instance, using only linear optical elements with say the
setup given in Fig. 1. (Actually, such setup only identifies
two of the four Bell states. But, this is fine as any Bell
state will allow a security proof to go through.) Further-
more, Alice and Bob apply decoy state techniques [15]
to estimate the gain (i.e., the probability that the relay
outputs a successful result) and quantum bit error rate
(QBER) for various input photon numbers.
Once the quantum communication phase is completed,
Charles uses a public channel to announce the events
where he has obtained a successful outcome in the re-
lay, including as well his measurement result. Alice and
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FIG. 1. Basic setup of a MDI-QKD protocol. Alice and Bob
prepare phase randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs) in a
different BB84 polarization state which is selected, indepen-
dently and at random for each signal, by means of a polar-
ization modulator (Pol-M). Decoy states are generated using
an intensity modulator (Decoy-IM). Inside the measurement
device, signals from Alice and Bob interfere at a 50:50 beam
splitter (BS) that has on each end a polarizing beam split-
ter (PBS) projecting the input photons into either horizontal
(H) or vertical (V ) polarization states. Four single-photon
detectors are employed to detect the photons and the detec-
tion results are publicly announced. A successful Bell state
measurement corresponds to the observation of precisely two
detectors (associated to orthogonal polarizations) being trig-
gered. A click in D1H and D2V , or in D1V and D2H , indicates
a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉),
while a click in D1H and D1V , or in D2H and D2V , reveals a
projection into the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉+|V H〉). Al-
ice’s and Bob’s laboratories are well shielded from the eaves-
dropper, while the measurement device can be untrusted.
Bob keep the data that correspond to these instances and
discard the rest. Moreover, as in BB84, they post-select
the events where they use the same basis in their trans-
mission by means of an authenticated public channel.
Finally, to guarantee that their bit strings are correctly
correlated, either Alice or Bob has to apply a bit flip to
her/his data, except for the cases where both of them
select the diagonal basis and Charles obtains a successful
measurement outcome corresponding to a triplet state.
This is illustrated in Table 1.
Alice & Bob Relay output |ψ−〉 Relay output |ψ+〉
Rectilinear basis Bit flip Bit flip
Diagonal basis Bit flip -
TABLE I. Alice and Bob post-select the events where the
relay outputs a successful result and they use the same basis
in their transmission. Moreover, either Alice or Bob flips
her/his bits except for the cases where both of them select
the diagonal basis and the relay outputs a triplet.
Let us now evaluate the performance of the protocol
above in detail. The proof of its unconditional security
is shown in Appendix A. For simplicity, we consider a
refined data analysis where Alice and Bob evaluate the
data sent in two bases separately [16]. In particular, we
use the rectilinear basis as the key generation basis, while
the diagonal basis is used for testing only. A piece of
notation: Let us denote by Qn,mrect , Q
n,m
diag, e
n,m
rect and e
n,m
diag,
the gain and QBER, respectively, of the signal states sent
by Alice and Bob, where n and m denote the number
of photons sent by the legitimate users, and rect/diag
represents their basis choice.
(A) Rectilinear basis: An error corresponds to a suc-
cessful relay output when both Alice and Bob prepare
the same polarization state (i.e., their results should be
anti-correlated before they apply a bit flip). Assuming
for the moment ideal optical elements and detectors, and
no misalignment, we have that whenever Alice and Bob
send, respectively, n andm photons prepared in the same
polarization state the relay will never output a successful
result. We obtain then that en,mrect is zero for all n,m. This
means that no error correction is needed for the sifted
key. This is remarkable because it implies that the us-
age of WCP sources (rather than single-photon sources)
does not substantially lower the key generation rate of
the QKD protocol (in the error correction part).
(B) Diagonal basis: To work out the amount of privacy
amplification needed we examine the diagonal basis. An
error corresponds to a projection into the singlet state
given that Alice and Bob prepared the same polarization
state, or into the triplet state when they prepare orthogo-
nal polarizations. Assuming again the ideal scenario dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph, we find that e1,1diag = 0.
(This is because when two identical single-photons enter
a 50:50 BS the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) effect [17] en-
sures that both photons will always exit the BS together
in the same output mode. Also, if the two photons are
prepared in orthogonal polarizations and they exit the
50:50 BS in the same output arm, both photons will al-
ways reach the same detector within the relay.) The fact
that e1,1diag is zero is again remarkable as it means that the
usage of WCP sources does not substantially lower the
key generation (in also the privacy amplification part).
(C) Key generation rate: In the ideal scenario de-
scribed above the key generation rate will be simply given
by R = Q1,1rect in the asymptotic limit of an infinitely long
key. On the other hand, if we take imperfections such
as basis misalignment and dark counts into account, the
key generation rate in a realistic setup will be given by
[12, 16, 18]
R = Q1,1rect[1−H(e1,1diag)]−Qrectf(Erect)H(Erect), (1)
where Qrect and Erect denote, respectively, the gain and
QBER in the rectilinear basis (i.e., Qrect =
∑
n,mQ
n,m
rect ,
and Erect =
∑
n,mQ
n,m
rect e
n,m
rect/Qrect), f(Erect) > 1 is an
inefficiency function for the error correction process, and
H(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function.
There are few loose ends that need to be tightened
up. First, we have implicitly assumed that the decoy
state method can be used to estimate the gain Q1,1rect and
the QBER e1,1diag. Second, we need to evaluate the se-
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FIG. 2. Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (1) in logarithmic scale for the MDI-QKD setup with
WCPs illustrated in Fig. 1 (green curve). For simulation pur-
poses, we consider the following experimental parameters [19]:
the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.2 dB/km, the intrinsic
error rate due to misalignment and instability of the optical
system is 1.5%, the detection efficiency of the relay (i.e., the
transmittance of its optical components together with the ef-
ficiency of its detectors) is 14.5%, and the background count
rate is 6.02 × 10−6. (For simplicity, we consider a simplified
model of misalignment by putting a unitary rotation in one
of the input arms of the 50:50 BS and also a unitary rotation
in one of its output arms. The total misalignment value is
1.5%. That is, we assume a misalignment of 0.75% in each
rotation.) In comparison, the red curve represents a lower
bound on R for an entanglement-based QKD protocol with
a parametric down conversion (PDC) source situated in the
middle between Alice and Bob [21]. In the red curve, we
have assumed that an optimal brightness of a PDC source
is employed. However, in practice, the brightness of a PDC
source is limited by technology. Therefore, the key rate of an
entanglement-based QKD protocol will be much lower than
what is shown in the red curve. This makes our new proposal
even more favorable than the comparison that is presented in
the current Figure.
cret key rate given by Eq. (1) for a realistic setup. Let
us tighten up these loose ends here. Indeed, it can be
shown that the technique to estimate the relevant param-
eters in the key rate formula is equivalent to that used in
standard decoy-state QKD systems (see Appendix B for
details). For simulation purposes, we consider inefficient
and noisy threshold detectors and employ experimental
parameters from [19] with the exception that [19] con-
sidered a free-space channel whereas here we consider a
fiber-based channel with a loss of 0.2 dB/km. Moreover,
for simplicity, we assume that all detectors are equal (i.e.,
they have the same dark count rate and detection effi-
ciency), and their dark counts are, to a good approxima-
tion, independent of the incoming signals. Furthermore,
we use an error correction protocol with inefficiency func-
tion f(Erect) = 1.16 [20]. The resulting lower bound on
the secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 2. Our calcula-
tions and simulation results demonstrate that the key
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FIG. 3. Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between two phase
randomized WCPs. The average photon number is 0.1 per
pulse. The coincidence rate is recorded at different time de-
lays. The error bars show the statistical fluctuation (± one
standard deviation) due to finite data size.
rate is highly comparable to a security proof [21] for
entanglement-based QKD protocols. Our scheme can tol-
erate a high optical loss of more than 40dB (i.e., 200km
of optical fibers) when a relay is placed in the middle of
Alice and Bob. That is, one can essentially double the
transmission distance over a setup where the Bell mea-
surement apparatus is on Alice’s side or a setup using a
standard decoy-state BB84 protocol [22].
To experimentally implement the MDI-QKD protocol
proposed, there are a few practical issues that have to
be addressed. Among them, the most important one is
probably how to generate indistinguishable photons from
two independent laser sources and observe stable HOM
interference [17]. Note that the physics behind this pro-
tocol is based on the photon bunching effect of two in-
distinguishable photons at a 50:50 BS. We performed
a simple proof of principle experiment to show that a
high-visibility HOM interference between two indepen-
dent off-the-shelf lasers is actually feasible (see details
in Appendix C). The results are shown in Fig. 3. The
consistency between experimental and theoretical results
confirms that a high-visibility HOM dip can be obtained
even with two independent lasers.
The idea of MDI-QKD can be generalized much fur-
ther. First of all, it also applies to the case where Alice
and Bob use entangled photon pairs as sources. Sec-
ond, it works even when Alice and Bob’s preparation pro-
cesses are imperfect. Indeed, basis-dependence that orig-
inates from the imperfection in Alice and Bob’s prepa-
ration processes can be readily taken care of by using
a quantum coin idea [12, 18] to quantify the amount of
basis-dependent flaw [24]. Third, notice that in prac-
tical applications only a finite number of decoy states
will be needed. This is similar to standard finite de-
coy state QKD protocols [25] that have been widely em-
ployed in experiments [26]. Fourth, MDI-QKD works
even without a refined data analysis. Fifth, it works also
4for other QKD protocols including the six-state protocol
[27]. These subjects will be discussed further in future
publications.
In summary, we have proposed the idea of measure-
ment device independent QKD (MDI-QKD). Compared
to standard security proofs, it has a key advantage of re-
moving all detector side channels, and it can double the
transmission distance covered with conventional QKD
schemes using WCPs. Moreover, it has a rather high key
generation rate which is comparable to that of standard
security proofs. Indeed, its key generation rate is orders
of magnitude higher than the previous approach of full
device independent QKD. Our idea can be implemented
with standard threshold detectors with low detection ef-
ficiency and highly lossy channels. In view of its excellent
security, performance and simple implementation, we be-
lieve MDI-QKD is a big step forward in bridging the gap
between the theory and practice of QKD, and we expect
to be widely employed in practical QKD systems in the
future.
Notes Added: After the posting of our paper on public
preprint servers, another paper by Braunstein and Piran-
dola [28] has been posted on the preprint servers [29].
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Appendix A: Security analysis
Here, we show that our protocol for measurement de-
vice independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD)
is unconditionally secure. Our security proof is inspired
by that of a time reversed EPR-based QKD protocol
[31] and the decoy state method [15]. It can be ap-
plied to practical phase randomized weak coherent pulses
(WCPs) generated by a laser [32].
In the protocol, each of Alice and Bob uses decoy states
and WCPs to prepare the four BB84 states and sends
their state to Charles. Charles combines the two sig-
nals sent by Alice and Bob and performs a Bell mea-
surement. Afterwards, he announces in a public channel
whether he has received a Bell state and which specific
Bell state he has received, say, for instance, a singlet
state 1/
√
2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉). Alice and Bob post-select
only those transmission events where Charles has re-
ceived some specific Bell state.
Using decoy states, Alice and Bob can now obtain the
gain and QBER of those events where both of them send
to Charlie single-photon states. As in GLLP [12], let
us consider a virtual qubit idea. Instead of preparing a
single-photon BB84 state, Alice prepares its purification.
That is to say that one could imagine that Alice actu-
ally has a virtual qubit on her side and she prepares her
state by first preparing an entangled state of the com-
bined system of her virtual qubit and the qubit that she
is sending out in say a singlet state. She subsequently
measures her virtual qubit, thus preparing a BB84 state.
(Similarly, Bob uses a virtual qubit to help him prepare
a single-photon BB84 state.)
Now, in principle, Alice could as well keep her virtual
qubit in her quantum memory and delay her measure-
ment on it. Only after Charles has announced that he
has obtained a successful outcome (say a singlet), will Al-
ice perform a measurement on her virtual qubit to decide
on which state she is sending to Bob.
In such virtual qubits setting, the protocol is directly
equivalent to an entanglement based protocol [2, 3, 33].
Alice and Bob share a pair of qubits in their quantum
memories and they simply compute the QBER on their
virtual qubits in the XX and ZZ bases.
Furthermore, with the above virtual qubit picture in
mind, one sees that what Alice and Bob actually send
out is unimportant for security proofs as long as their
single-photon signals are basis-independent. In the event
that there are some basis-dependent flaws in their prepa-
ration, Alice and Bob can take care of them by using a
quantum coin idea [12, 34]. (Notice that GLLP [12] only
considers imperfect state preparation by Alice. Here we
are interested in simultaneous imperfections in both Al-
ice and Bob. Nonetheless, with the above virtual qubit
formulation, such simultaneous imperfections can still be
taken care of by the quantum coin idea. One only needs
to consider the fidelity between the combined states sent
out by Alice and Bob ρXAB and ρ
Z
AB, where Alice and Bob
both use either the X or Z basis. For a more detailed
discussion, see, for example, [34].)
Furthermore, our protocol can tolerate very high chan-
nel loss and very low success probability of a Bell mea-
surement without compromising its security. This is be-
cause Alice and Bob can post-select only those successful
events for a Bell-state measurement by Charles for con-
sideration. Note that Alice and Bob could have imple-
mented their protocol with virtual qubits in their quan-
tum memories and could have waited until Charles an-
nounces which Bell-state measurement results are suc-
cessful. Indeed, in security proofs such as [2] and [3],
losses do not affect security.
Appendix B: Estimation procedure
Here we show that the decoy state method [15] applied
to MDI-QKD allows Alice and Bob to estimate the rele-
vant parameters to evaluate the secret key rate formula
in the asymptotic regime. In particular, they can obtain
the gain Q1,1rect and the QBER e
1,1
diag.
Our starting point is the standard decoy state tech-
nique applied to conventional QKD. We assume it per-
mits Alice and Bob to estimate the yield Yn and error
5rate en of an n-photon signal for all n [15]. That is, the
set of linear equations
Qi =
∞∑
n=0
e−µi
µni
n!
Yn, (B1)
QiEi =
∞∑
n=0
e−µi
µni
n!
Ynen, (B2)
with the index i denoting the different decoy settings, can
be solved and Alice and Bob can obtain the parameters
Yn and en for all n.
In MDI-QKD we have the following set of linear equa-
tions:
Qi,jrect =
∞∑
n,m=0
e−µi
µni
n!
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mrect , (B3)
Qi,jdiag =
∞∑
n,m=0
e−µi
µni
n!
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mdiag , (B4)
and
Qi,jrectE
i,j
rect =
∞∑
n,m=0
e−µi
µni
n!
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mrect e
n,m
rect ,
Qi,jdiagE
i,j
diag =
∞∑
n,m=0
e−µi
µni
n!
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mdiag e
n,m
diag,
where the indexes i and j represent, respectively, the
different decoy settings used by Alice and Bob.
Let us begin with the gain Qi,jrect. This quantity can be
written as
Qi,jrect =
∞∑
n=0
e−µi
µni
n!
Y jn;rect, (B5)
where
Y jn;rect =
∞∑
m=0
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mrect . (B6)
For j fixed, varying i we have that Eq. (B5) is equivalent
to Eq. (B1). This means that Alice and Bob can esti-
mate the parameters Y jn;rect. Once the yields Y
j
n;rect are
obtained for all j, we have that Eq. (B6) is again equiv-
alent to Eq. (B1) and the legitimate users can estimate
the parameters Y n,mrect .
Similarly, it can be shown that Alice and Bob can es-
timate Y n,mdiag .
Let us now focus on the QBER Ei,jrect. It can be written
as
Qi,jrectE
i,j
rect =
∞∑
n=0
e−µi
µni
n!
W jn;rect, (B7)
where
W jn;rect =
∞∑
m=0
e−µj
µmj
m!
Y n,mrect e
n,m
rect . (B8)
Again, for j fixed, varying i we have that Eq. (B7) is
equivalent to Eq. (B1), so Alice and Bob can estimate the
parameters W jn;rect. Once these quantities are obtained
for all j, we have that Eq. (B8) is equivalent to Eq. (B2)
with the yields Y n,mrect already known. This means that
Alice and Bob can estimate en,mrect .
Similarly, it can be shown that Alice and Bob can es-
timate en,mdiag.
We have demonstrated that Alice and Bob can esti-
mate the parameters Y n,mrect , Y
n,m
diag , e
n,m
rect , and e
n,m
diag for all
n and m in the asymptotic case; in particular, they can
obtain the relevant quantities Y 1,1rect and e
1,1
diag. Now, the
gain Q1,1rect is given by
Q1,1rect = µAµBe
−(µA+µB)Y 1,1rect, (B9)
where µA and µB denote, respectively, the mean photon
number of Alice and Bob’s signals.
In practical applications only a finite number of decoy
states will be needed. This is similar to standard finite
decoy state QKD protocols [25, 35].
Appendix C: Experimental setup of proof of concept
experiment
For our idea of MDI-QKD to work in practice, it is
important to be able to obtain interference between sig-
nals generated by two independent lasers (on Alice’s and
Bob’s sides) [36]. Notice that this requirement is at the
heart of many quantum information applications such as
quantum repeaters, teleportation, qubit amplifiers for de-
vice independent QKD, etc. Many investigations and a
lot of progress have been made on this subject in recent
years (see, e.g., [37] and references therein).
To show that photons from two independent laser
sources can be made indistinguishable and interfere with
each other, we have performed a simple proof of concept
experiment. The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1.
S1 denotes a 1550nm cw fiber laser (NP photonics) and
S2 is a wavelength tunable cw laser (Agilent). Both lasers
have linewidths less than 1MHz and there is no optical
or electrical connection between them. The central wave-
length of S2 can be adjusted at steps of 0.1pm (which
corresponds to 13MHz at 1550nm). Two optical inten-
sity modulators (IM1 and IM2) are employed to generate
narrow laser pulses from the above two cw lasers. Each
of these two intensity modulators is driven by an elec-
trical pulse generator (Avtech, PG1 and PG2), which is
triggered by a 4-channel delay generator (DG). The time
delay between the two laser pulse trains can be adjusted
by the delay generator at ps resolution. Two variable
optical attenuators (Att1 and Att2) are used to deter-
mine the average photon number per laser pulse. An
optical phase modulator (PM) is used to scan the phase
of one laser pulse train. The two laser pulse trains in-
terfere at a symmetric 2x2 fiber coupler (BS), and the
interference signals are detected by two InGaAs single-
photon detectors (SPD, ID Quantique). A time interval
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FIG. 4. Experimental setup. S1: 1550nm cw fiber laser
(NP photonics); S2: wavelength tunable cw laser (Agilent);
IM1-IM2: optical intensity modulators; Att1-Att2: variable
optical attenuators; PC1-PC2: polarization controllers; PM:
optical phase modulator; BS: 50:50 fiber beam splitter; SPD1-
SPD2: single-photon detectors; TIA: Time Interval Analyzer
(Picoquant); PG1-PG2: electrical pulse generators (Avtech);
AWG1-AWG2: arbitrary waveform generators (Agilent); DG:
delay generator (Stanford research systems).
analyzer (TIA, Picoquant) is employed to perform a co-
incident measurement. The whole system is built upon
single-mode telecom fiber based components, thus the
spatial modes of the two laser beams are identical. By
using two polarization controllers (PC1 and PC2), we
can ensure that the two laser pulse trains are in the same
polarization state when they interfere at the BS. In this
experiment, Alice and Bob are on the same optical table
and the fiber length from Alice/Bob to the measurement
device is only a few meters.
The pulse shapes of the laser pulses that output
from the two intensity modulators have been carefully
matched by adjusting the two electrical pulse generators.
This shape is approximately Gaussian with a pulse width
(FWHM) around 200ps. The corresponding spectral
bandwidth is about 5GHz, which is significantly larger
than the central frequency mismatch (below 30MHz dur-
ing the whole experiment). Thus the photons from the
two lasers are indistinguishable in the spectral domain.
The MDI-QKD protocol proposed encodes quantum
information in phase randomized WCPs. This means
that the phase should be randomly changed from pulse
to pulse. This can be achieved by using an optical phase
modulator after each laser to introduce a random phase
shift from pulse to pulse, as we have demonstrated previ-
ously [38]. Here, for simplicity, the phase shift is scanned
periodically in the range of [0, 2pi] at 900Hz. In our ex-
periment, the laser pulse repetition rate is 500KHz and
one measurement takes about 500s, thus the phase is
equivalently randomized.
We measure the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference
at an average photon number of 0.1 per pulse. During
the experiment, at each time delay δt2−δt1 , we record the
detection probability of SPD1 (P1), the detection prob-
ability of SPD2 (P2), and the probability of having a
simultaneous “click” in both SPDs within a coincidence
window of 2ns (PC). The normalized coincidence rate
is calculated as C = PC/(P1P2). The experimental re-
sults are shown in Fig. 3 of the Main Text of our paper.
For comparison purposes, this figure also includes the
theoretical results obtained using perfect 200ps Gaussian
pulses. The error bars arise from statistical fluctuations
(± one standard deviation) due to finite data size. The
measured HOM dip is 0.534±0.005. This result confirms
that a high-visibility HOM dip can be obtained with in-
dependent lasers, thus demonstrating the feasibility of
our QKD protocol.
The major error sources in the experiment seem to be
the pulse shape mismatch and time jitter. Limited by
the equipment available in our lab, PG1 and PG2 are
actually two different pulse generators which has limited
control over pulse shapes. Other sources of errors are
the finite extinction ratio of the intensity modulator, the
frequency mismatch between the two lasers, the polar-
ization mismatch, the asymmetry of the BS, the error in
determining the average photon number, the dark counts
of the SPDs, and statistical fluctuations due to finite data
size.
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